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Moral action as cheater suppression 
in human superorganisms
Robert Aunger*
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK
For it is peculiar to man as compared to the other animals that he alone has a perception 
of good and bad and just and unjust and other things [of this sort]; and partnership in 
these things is what makes a household and a city. (Aristotle, The Politics 37)
Aristotle. The Politics. Trans. Carnes Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Developments in human technology and social organization have enabled the kinds of 
social roles that individuals can undertake to proliferate—creating a degree of interde-
pendence not seen in other species. Human societies cannot rely on shared genetic 
interests or dyadic reciprocity to ensure social cohesion because genetic similarity is 
low while indirect reciprocity is rife; nevertheless, such societies cohere, due to the 
evolution of novel regulatory mechanisms that inhibit defaulting on social obligations: 
moral sentiments and actions. While the degree of social cooperation created by these 
mechanisms remains less than that of the eusocial insects, it is sufficient to suggest that 
contemporary human societies constitute crude “superorganisms” to which their mem-
bers have wide-ranging responsibilities. The present paper argues that the domains and 
extent of moral regulation can be most usefully identified by defining the set of functions 
required to sustain a human superorganism. These functions are shown to be boundary, 
production, distribution, storage, control, structure, enforcement, signaling, memory, 
excretion, perception, and reproduction. Moral obligations to act then arise when indi-
viduals default on contributing to these functions. Major evolutionary transition theory 
is used to justify claims as to the crucial aspects of superorganism functioning, which 
enabled human superorganismal groups to form, and thus what aspects of morality had 
to be developed since the time of our common ancestor with other primates. Finally, 
comparison is made to Moral Foundations Theory, and the Model of Moral Motives 
and Dyadic Morality approaches, which suggests that Human Superorganism Theory 
is simultaneously more parsimonious while being more broadly explanatory. We believe 
this new approach to defining the moral domain has implications for fields ranging from 
psychology to legal theory.
Keywords: major transition theory, morality, moral psychology, ultrasociality, superorganisms
DeFining The MOral DOMain
Until recently, morality was largely the domain of philosophers. A typical debate might involve 
defining why killing another human being is wrong (taken as one of the foundations for a good 
society). Answers might include because it will destabilize society and lead to general unhappiness 
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(the consequentialist position of Berkeley), or because it vio-
lates the Golden Rule of doing to others what we would want 
them to do to us (subscribed to by deontologists like Kant), or 
because people of good upbringing and hence virtuous character 
would not be inclined to do so (the position of virtue theorists 
like Aristotle). However, relatively little headway was made on 
such ethical issues because the standard philosophical toolkit of 
linguistic analysis, logical argument, and introspection provided 
insufficient means to settle such arguments.
Currently, a variety of disciplines have begun to engage in 
empirical investigations into the nature of morality. Indeed, 
morality is currently a hot topic in biology (Alexander, 1987), 
psychology (Hauser, 2006), philosophy (Joyce, 2007), law 
(Sunstein, 2005), primatology (de Waal, 2009), and the social 
sciences (Nichols, 2004). Though controversies continue to rage, 
there is now general agreement about some aspects of morality. 
It is thought to be a quintessentially human trait, although the 
behavioral roots of morality (such as loyalty to kin, intolerance of 
theft, and punishment of cheats) can be seen in related primate 
species (Boyd et  al., 2003; Boyd and Richerson, 2006; Hauser 
et al., 2009).
Moral systems have psychological, social, and behavioral 
components: the psychological mechanisms enable individuals 
to recognize actions that are moralized and produce intentions 
to conform to normative expectations as well as to punish moral 
offenders; social mechanisms like ostracism or shunning help 
to enforce moral norms; and behavioral violations invoke the 
activation of the psychological and social mechanisms in the first 
place (i.e., immoral actions like incest or murder). All of these 
components need to be in place for moral systems to function 
properly.
Recent work in psychology has established a number of 
principles relevant to morality. It is broadly accepted that moral 
judgments have specific emotional underpinnings (e.g., shame, 
guilt and retribution) (Haidt, 2003; Moll et al., 2005; Nelissen and 
Zeelenberg, 2009) and are made rapidly without rational calcu-
lation as to harms and benefits (Haidt, 2001)—although when 
presented with moral dilemmas, people may derive judgments 
from the interaction of intuitive and rational faculties (Greene 
et al., 2001). Further, Mikhail’s notion of a “moral grammar” may 
help explain how moral intuitions are generated via a set of both 
rational and emotional components in the brain (Hauser, 2006; 
Mikhail, 2011).
Debate continues, however, as to exactly what functions 
morality serves—except to say that moral judgments and action 
facilitate social cohesion in some way (Hauser, 2006; Joyce, 2007; 
Bekoff and Pierce, 2009; de Waal, 2009). Indeed, there is a grow-
ing consensus that morality evolved to enable human cooperation 
(Rawls, 1971; Hume, 1998; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010; Ellemers and 
Van der Toorn, 2015; Curry, 2016). For example, Joyce (2007) 
argues that making actions moral (i.e., normative) increases their 
motivational impetus, thus increasing the likelihood of coopera-
tive activity. But why do we think of assault, theft, eating meat, 
abduction, public nudity, treason, rape, counterfeiting money, 
and denying the Holocaust as all being immoral? Punishment 
would not seem to explicitly facilitate cooperation in all these 
cases. Here, we will argue these concerns all constitute violations 
of implicit obligations to obey social rules. These obligations 
derive from a requirement that emerged from developments in 
social organization during the recent evolutionary history of our 
species.
In particular, moral actions seek to control defections from 
public obligations by other members of large-scale human 
groups. This problem is acute because humans depend on each 
other—due to a significant division of labor—for everyday 
necessities, but cannot rely on shared genes or direct reciprocity 
to ensure ready supplies of what is needed to stay alive. Social 
organization in large groups of unrelated individuals instead 
depends on threats of retaliation for failures to abide by coop-
erative obligations, including fulfilling one’s own roles in the 
social group. These threats are made real by an underlying moral 
psychology that motivates the punishment of social infractions, 
even in the face of no direct benefit to the punisher. In effect, 
anyone in such a social group can potentially punish (or reward) 
anyone else in the group for “bad” (or “good”) behavior. Thus, 
we will defend a particular proposition that morality evolved to 
solve particular problems of cooperation—problems associated 
with ultrasociality. Essentially, morality can be hypothesized to 
have evolved as a system of behavioral control to aid coopera-
tion in large groups, which cannot rely on shared genes to cause 
overlapping interests. Further, we will argue that to the degree 
that these large-scale groups cohere and function (at least partly 
thanks to moral threats and actions), they can be called human 
“superorganisms.”
The remainder of this paper will outline this new approach to 
elucidation of the moral domain, Human Superorganism Theory 
(HSoT). We conclude that identifying the adaptive function of 
moral action should go a long way toward clarifying the ancillary 
issues that dominate the contemporary study of morality.
hUMan sOcieTY as a sUPerOrganisM
The idea that human societies form superorganisms can be 
derived from a recent development in evolutionary biology 
called “major transition theory” (Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 
1995). The basic premise of this theory is that the means by which 
information can be stored, translated, and transmitted from one 
generation to the next has itself changed a number of times dur-
ing the history of evolution on Earth. Major transition theory 
thus suggests that the way evolution works has itself evolved, 
with the consequence that new levels of functional complexity 
are achieved with each transition (e.g., the transition from RNA 
to DNA as the store of genetic information, or unicellular to 
multicellular life, or multicellular to social life).
The central difficulty in using major transition theory for 
explaining any evolutionary problem is showing how cheating 
can be suppressed at the lower level so a higher level of organi-
zation can evolve (Buss, 1987; Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 
1995; Michod, 1999). This is because there are always incentives 
(in strategic, or even genetic terms) for the members of an 
organization to defect from the cooperative actions that sustain 
the new level of cohesion in favor of their individual interests. 
Mechanisms for regulating these “selfish” behaviors must there-
fore evolve to consolidate activities that ensure the new level of 
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organization coheres and persists. These mechanisms are likely to 
be specific to each case of transition.
Once the first step of suppression has occurred, there is 
typically a second stage during which differentiation of function 
occurs within the new structure (Szathmáry, 2015; West et  al., 
2015). For example, explaining the evolution of multicellular 
from unicellular life forms may have to do with a mutation that 
causes cells not to separate after division, thus suppressing their 
independence, and then acquiring a reproductive/soma differen-
tiation of function (Gavrilets, 2010).
The most recent transition recognized by major transition 
theory is that to ultrasociety (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 
1998). The human species is unique in living in ultrasocial 
groups—that is, large groups of cooperative members who are 
essentially unrelated to one another (e.g., in tribal groups, or 
cities) (Richerson and Boyd, 1998). Recall that for a major transi-
tion to occur, fitness differences within constituent groups must 
be suppressed so that selection at the level of the group becomes 
the primary evolutionary force at work. Major transition theory 
argues that a reproductive bottleneck helps reduce conflicts 
of interest at the group level (Bourke, 2011; Szathmáry, 2015). 
Some insect societies exhibit extreme restrictions on genetic 
variability (and hence limit social conflict) by having a single 
female, the queen, serve as the sole reproducer (Hölldobler and 
Wilson, 2008).
Human societies have not (yet) achieved such a group-level 
adaptation. Nevertheless, there is a strong division in the human 
superorganism between “somatic” functions and the reproduc-
tive function. In particular, a specialized institution, the human 
family, has evolved as the vehicle for reproduction (Emlen, 1995; 
Geary and Flinn, 2001), which serves to restrict both genetic 
variability in human populations (which is very low compared to 
other primate species) (Bowden et al., 2012), and overall group 
population size. While human females are born with around two 
million eggs, a variety of mechanisms have evolved to reduce 
actual completed fertility to a very small number. Sequestering 
of newly reproductive females in puberty huts and restriction 
of their social movement until pair-bonded ensure that expo-
sure to males is minimized early in life. Concealed ovulation 
ensures that males do not fight over access to a woman during 
a brief, obvious period of fertility, reducing sexual tensions in a 
group, and making it possible for some reproductive cycles to 
pass without insemination, reducing fertility (Geary and Flinn, 
2001; Marlowe and Berbesque, 2012). During the majority of a 
human female’s reproductive career, she is (except in extreme 
ecological circumstances) limited to forming a single breeding 
pair (i.e., monogamy) (Zeitzen, 2008; Chapais, 2013). These 
single pair-bonds are reinforced through cultural rules associated 
with the institution of marriage, which make it more difficult for 
women to break out of this bond (and which also reduces male 
competition for access to females). Then, when a woman is older, 
menopause, or an evolved incapacity for further reproduction, 
ensures that her own reproductive effort ceases, so that she begins 
to aid the reproductive success of the next generation family to 
which she is most closely related (Davis and Daly, 1997; Hawkes 
and Coxworth, 2013). All of these mechanisms serve to tightly 
regulate female reproductive potential and ensure the isolation 
of reproduction from other functions in society, as one would 
expect of a superorganism.
With reproductive function isolated in these ways, other 
social structures could arise to serve various kinds of “somatic” 
functions. Here, too, fitness differences have been suppressed. 
Ultrasociality appears to have been achieved by transforming 
the ancestral form of social organization in related ape species 
of rank-based dominance (which creates significant differences 
in fitness between individuals within a social group) to one of 
enforced egalitarianism, as seen in extant human forager socie-
ties (Boehm, 1999). The initial trigger for the evolution of large 
groups in our human ancestors may have been a change in diet 
toward meat eating, which required group foraging (Tomasello 
et  al., 2012; Tomasello and Vaish, 2013). In these societies, 
potential fitness differences are suppressed through enforced 
food sharing, monogamy, and alloparenting (sharing the parental 
care of particular children among families), all of which served to 
decrease fitness differences within groups. This first level of social 
interdependence for achieving basic needs was later reinforced 
by the need for coordinated defense against competing groups 
(Tomasello et al., 2012; Tomasello and Vaish, 2013). It appears that 
there was considerable inter-group conflict among our ancestors 
(Chagnon, 1983; Keeley, 1997; Peterson and Wrangham, 1997). 
Such inter-group aggression could have a considerable impact 
on fitness, because entire groups could be decimated, and their 
reproductive resources (women) lost to other groups from the 
frequent wars fought by such groups (Wrangham, 1999; Bowles 
et  al., 2003). Battles and raids would have been more likely to 
be successful to the extent that war parties were large and well 
organized.
Although these societies lacked centralized policing authori-
ties, they apparently could nevertheless coordinate large-scale 
inter-group competition via punishment mechanisms. Norms are 
more likely to be enforced as the degree of social interdepend-
ence increases (Horne, 2009), as is the case with large groups. 
For example, the Turkana, a contemporary African pastoralist 
society, engage in frequent cattle raids on other ethnic groups 
with parties of several 100 members drawn from most or all of the 
clans composing that ethnicity. Because these are risky endeavors, 
men can desert or otherwise defect, but such cheats are informally 
judged by the community, and beaten, fined, or socially excluded, 
even by those not present at a raid (Mathew and Boyd, 2011). It 
is also more likely that “parochial altruism” (cooperation against 
others) will evolve when there is significant inter-group conflict 
(Bowles, 2006; Choi and Bowles, 2007). Thus, prestate societies 
without formal institutions (only informal organizational prin-
ciples such as age grades, gender roles, and endogamy) are able 
to organize mechanisms that protect and sustain groups of many 
tens of thousands of individuals.
This combination of enforced egalitarianism within the group, 
coupled with significant inter-group competition, was an ideal 
way to minimize within-group selection and maximize inter-
group selection, thus facilitating the formation of organizational 
adaptations at the ultrasocial group level. If this combination was 
a general condition for prestate societies during human evolu-
tion, it would give considerable depth to the history of ultrasocial 
organization, consistent with the expectation of psychological 
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adaptations for such a lifestyle (e.g., shame, guilt, and moral con-
cern). Ethnic groups of this size probably arose tens of thousands 
of years ago—plenty of time for psychological adaptations to have 
been established. Then, more recently, the agricultural revolution 
brought the first economic surpluses, and therefore allowed for 
social specialization (Gowdy and Krall, 2016)—the sort of dif-
ferentiation of roles within the larger structure expected in the 
second step of a major transition.
Gene-culture coevolutionary theory provides evidence that 
specific psychological machinery to support morality—in the 
form of perceptual biases, social learning abilities, and neuro-
logical mechanisms—could have evolved in human populations 
through the kind of intensive cultural group selection just dis-
cussed, accounting for the appearance of moral systems in our 
recent history (Bowles et  al., 2014). According to this theory, 
humans should have evolved expectations to find some behaviors 
are sanctioned in the groups to which they belong, to have innate 
abilities to recognize which behaviors are moralized, to rapidly 
learn how to perform these behaviors from others in their vicinity 
through sophisticated forms of social learning, and to experience 
both conformity with norms and punishment of norm violators 
as rewarding, so that moral experiences are reinforced (Chudek 
et al., 2013). Further, this machinery should produce defaults that 
lead to automatic conformity with social norms, such that cogni-
tive efforts are necessary to override this tendency, so that the 
prosocial psychology has been internalized in the form of internal 
sanctions like feelings of shame or guilt. These suppositions are 
consistent with experiments using behavioral economic games, 
social psychological studies, and neuro-economic evidence.
Recent evolutionary biological theory also suggests that socie-
ties which become truly large share two characteristics: a multi-
individual (group-level) production system involving a division 
of labor and defensible outputs (e.g., nest), and a multi-individual 
reproductive system in which the young require significant 
nurturing (e.g., a colony) (Wilson, 2012). These features ensure 
high levels of social interdependence and form the organizational 
principles on which natural selection at the level of the group can 
act to secure cohesive ultrasocial groupings. In primate societies, 
raising an offspring successfully went from the job of the mother 
to the family, and in some cases, a troupe of alloparents (Mitani 
et al., 2012). Simultaneously, the basic economic production unit 
has gone from individuals to families to professional organiza-
tions (such as guilds and companies), as more and more resources 
have been dedicated to these processes, and a wider variety of 
interdependent roles have been required for the production 
of increasingly specialized outputs. Social groups with these 
two features thus developed both productive and reproductive 
stores of resources—in the form of domesticated animals and 
women—that could be contested by other groups, leading them 
to become desirable targets for takeover through inter-group con-
flict, as suggested above. Like eusocial insect groups, these human 
populations could be considered a “factory inside a fortress,” 
which constituted the foundation of selection for superorganisms 
(Wilson, 2012). This self-reinforcing process of social differentia-
tion leading to increasing resource accumulation allowed further 
increases in group size, culminating in the very large groups one 
can find in both social insects and humans.
These large groups of humans with a low average level of 
relatedness require novel mechanisms for maintaining social 
cohesion. The suggestion made here is that morality is a control 
mechanism punishing social defection in human ultrasocial 
groups (Haidt, 2007, 2012).
The primary question, then, is what set of functions is needed 
to organize cooperation in ultrasocial groups. Such a set should 
define the domain of moral action. To answer this question, 
we will treat human ultrasocial groups as superorganisms. A 
superorganism can be defined as a “collection of single creatures 
that together possess the functional organization implicit in the 
formal definition of organism” (Wilson and Sober, 1989). This is 
a perspective that has been adopted in evolutionary biology to 
describe the social organization of a variety of species, ranging 
from insects like ants, termites, and bees, to mole rats (Wheeler, 
1911; Seeley, 1989; Hölldobler and Wilson, 2008). The idea has 
also been extended to human social groups (Spencer, 1896; 
Campbell, 1958; Richerson and Boyd, 1999; Foster and Ratnieks, 
2005; Wilson et al., 2007; Christakis and Fowler, 2009; Szathmáry, 
2015). However, the extent to which human societies cohere is 
less than that seen in eusocial insects (which have the advantage 
of high levels of average kinship). Thus, we might say that the 
human superorganism is relatively “crude” (Richerson and Boyd, 
1999; Kesebir, 2012). It might also be the case that our major tran-
sition to superorganism status is still in progress and that future 
developments (e.g., the world wide web) will increase the degree 
of social cohesion, leading to an even greater relative importance 
of group selection pressures (Stearns, 2007). In any case, my 
contention will be that not only is human society organized in 
a fashion worthy to be called a (crude) superorganism but also 
that the function of morality is to police defections from coopera-
tive activities among individuals in their obligations as “cells” in a 
human superorganism.
a TheOrY OF sUPerOrganisM 
FUncTiOnaliTY
Our task then is to find a way to rigorously define these obli-
gations. This is a step that has not previously been taken in 
discussions of morality, partly because selection at a particular 
level of organization will produce novel adaptations to fulfill 
functions operating only at that level. Thus, one cannot assume 
that a superorganism (a level of coherent organization above the 
level of the individual organism) will exhibit all of the systems of 
a multicellular organism—that is, simply transferring “organs” 
from one level to the other by analogy is unlikely to work (Turner, 
2002). Rather, selection in groups could result in the evolution 
of novel features to support the development and maintenance 
of membership in groups (Brewer and Caporael, 2006). What 
we require then is a foundation for making inferences about 
the “shape” of a superorganism from a more general theory 
(Mitchell, 2003).
We can find that theory by recognizing that organisms at any 
level of organization are complex adaptive systems—that is, they 
can be described in terms of dynamic processes involving flows 
of material, energy, and information (Bowles, 2006; Miller and 
Page, 2007; Sumpter, 2010). As living systems, they are complex 
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adaptive systems that are open (i.e., exchange material, energy, 
and information with their environments) and self-organizing 
(by means of interactions among their elements), with emergent 
properties. Relevant kinds of organizational functions at the 
superorganism level can therefore be extracted from “living sys-
tems” theory (Miller, 1978), “minimal life” theory (Gánti, 2003; 
Rasmussen et al., 2007; Bedau, 2011), collective animal behavior 
(Sumpter, 2010), and eusocial insect ecology (where these socie-
ties are treated as superorganisms) (Wheeler, 1911; Seeley, 1989; 
Hölldobler and Wilson, 2008; Gadau and Fewell, 2009) as well by 
comparison to the set of organs in multicellular organisms like 
mammals, and the Indian caste system (taken as an example of a 
human superorganism) (Table 1).1
From these sources, we can extract a set of subsystems that 
all living systems must depend upon to survive and reproduce, 
regardless of their complexity.2 Any function nominated by two 
or more of these sources will be taken to qualify as a subsystem 
of a human superorganism (i.e., single nominations will be con-
sidered to be eccentric). There is a high level of agreement among 
these sources, with only a few nominations not qualifying by this 
rule (at the bottom of Table 1).
However, there are reasons to include two components, despite 
their not meeting this criterion, and to exclude another, even 
though it does. (Remember, one has to take into consideration the 
special features of superorganisms, rather than simply transfer all 
potential functions.) Enforcement can be included because it is 
the primary function of moral action and occurs at the organism 
level in humans—a close evolutionary analog to the human super-
organism—in the form of an immune system. Signaling should 
also be included because it happens in eusocial insects (although 
not mentioned explicitly by our source on eusociality)—another 
close analog of the human superorganism. Including signaling 
also makes for a complete set of information-based functions to 
mirror those working on material and energetic aspects.
Another decision has been taken to exclude one function even 
though it has been nominated by several sources: the motor/
movement function, which does not apply to human superor-
ganisms, as they do not move territory or migrate as large units 
of unrelated people (although eusocial insect colonies can move 
location when local resources are depleted). (Human superorgan-
isms are more akin to plants than animals in this respect, being 
concentrated on growth rather than movement.) Movements of 
superorganism “body” parts (e.g., displays of strength in the form 
of military parades, or signals of trustworthiness in the shape of 
free market institutions) can be considered expressive or com-
municative; hence, the most relevant kinds of superorganism 
“movement” are encapsulated in the notion of signaling in any 
case.
1 Other scholars are working in this area. Heylighen (2007) has previously argued 
that the functions of a human superorganism can be identified using living systems 
theory, but not in the context of morality. Kesebir (2012) has suggested that moral-
ity helps regulate human superorganisms but does not identify the specific kinds of 
obligations that would define a moral domain using this insight.
2 Other sources that are relevant, but that do not provide listings of system com-
ponents, because they are largely about principles of self-organisation, include 
cybernetics and general systems theory (von Neumann, 1966; von Bertalanffy, 
1968) and biological self-organisation theory (Camazine et al., 2001).
Thirteen functions of a human superorganism can be identified 
in this way (Table 2). For example, living systems need bounda-
ries to hold their elements together and protect them from threats 
in the external environment. These boundaries can manifest as 
specific structures at different levels of organization, such as a 
specialized membrane at cell level, skin at organism level, or an 
army (to patrol territorial encapsulation) at superorganism level.
This list of components can be adequately summarized by 
a phrase used to describe a eusocial superorganism: “a factory 
inside a fortress” (Oster and Wilson, 1978). This phrase highlights 
the sometimes competing goals of defense and production (the 
basic political and economic functions of any social group). For 
example, the biological fitness of a eusocial insect colony depends 
on the ratio of soldiers to workers: if there are more soldiers, the 
colony is more secure, but this means fewer workers, and hence 
reduced food production for the colony (i.e., the workers’ “fac-
tory” job), and hence a smaller colony size. Such colonies have 
mechanisms to regulate the soldier/worker ratio such that it opti-
mizes colony survival (Hölldobler and Wilson, 2008). Similarly, 
the number of plumbers, doctors, and lawyers in a human group 
is loosely regulated by market forces (i.e., how much these profes-
sions can earn).
Of particular interest for us is the fact that group cohesion 
requires agents at sub-levels in the organization to act for the 
good of the group rather than in their own genetic interest. As a 
consequence, punishment is needed to keep individual elements 
in line. In cells, punishment is undertaken by lysosomes, cellular 
organelles that contain acidic enzymes to break down waste 
materials and cellular debris. They digest excess or worn-out 
organelles, food particles, and pathogens. In multicellular organ-
isms, punishment is meted out by the immune system, which 
identifies pathogens and kills them. In superorganisms, we argue 
that this policing function is performed by individuals motivated 
by moral sentiments. These motivations inspire people to punish 
infractions by other members of their group. Opportunities to 
serve a moral function arise when individuals fail to perform 
their functions as components of a superorganism. (Note that 
we suggest all tasks are subject to policing, including failures to 
serve informational or other control functions—even policing 
itself.) In such situations, other individuals are required to serve 
as enforcing agents, bringing the offenders back into line, so that 
the human superorganism continues to cohere. It is this domain 
of behavior we wish to investigate here.
Functions in the human superorganism
Thus, we suggest that people living in a superorganism serve 
functions analogous in many cases to the cells in a multicellular 
organism (Richerson and Boyd, 1999). The human superorgan-
ism thus needs to work properly in many ways. We now discuss 
each of these functions in turn. Remember that we argue moral 
actions are those which punish those who defect from their 
obligations. Whereas cells tend to serve a single function—e.g., 
as muscle or fat cells, neurons, or sensory receptors—individuals 
do not exhibit the same level of specialization due to the more 
recent, looser organization of ultrasocial groups. Hence, a par-
ticular individual may serve a variety of superorganism functions 
during their lifetime.
TaBle 1 | Potential components of the human superorganism.a
component living systems 
theory
Mammalian organ systems eusocial systems indian caste 
system
Minimal life collective animal 
behavior
Boundary Boundary Integumentary system (e.g., 
skin)
Defensive caste (e.g., 
soldiers), colony recognition 
labels, and alarm-defense 
communication
Kshatriyas 
(warriors)
Holism 
(indivisibility)
Predation defense
Control 
(decision-making)
Decider Nervous system (brain) Brahmins (priests) Control Collective decision-
making and regulation
Production Producer Worker caste Shudras (artisans) Metabolism Enhanced foraging
Structure Supporter Skeletal system Nest Stability Structures (e.g., nests)
Communication 
(info-distribution)
Channel and net Nervous/endocrine systems Communication interactions Information 
carrying
Information transfer
Distribution Distributor Circulatory system (i.e., 
cardiovascular and lymphatic)
Food distribution system Vaisyas 
(merchants)
Reproduction Reproducer Reproductive system (e.g., 
gonads)
Reproductive caste (e.g., 
queen)
Reproductive 
opportunities
Perception 
(info-production)
Input transducer Sensory systems (e.g., eyes 
and ears)
Combined sensory organs of 
members
Excretion Extruder Excretory system (e.g., 
kidneys and bladder)
Harijans 
(outcastes)
Storage Matter-energy 
storage
Adipose tissue (i.e., body fat)
Memory 
(info-storage)
Memory Endocannabinoid systemb
Signaling 
(info-excretion)
Output transducer
Enforcement Immune systems
Motor Muscular system Locomotion efficiency
Ingestor
Converter
Internal transducer
Decoder
Associator
Encoder
Respiratory system
Vestibular system (e.g., 
cochlea)
aDerived from Miller (1978), Hölldobler and Wilson (2008) (Figure 5.1), traditional social distinctions in India (Bhattacharya, 1995), the set of mammalian organ systems, Gánti (2003), 
and Sumpter (2010), respectively. (Note: collective animal behavior lists the evolutionary benefits of group living, which can be tied to specific functions.)
bThe recently identified endocannabinoid system (composed of a class of lipids and specialized brain receptors) plays a central role in the regulation of learning and memory. It acts 
essentially as a negative feedback mechanism within the central nervous system to dampen the release of classic neurotransmitters. By so doing, it helps control energy balance 
(eating, digestion, adipose storage, and related metabolic processes), but is also actively involved in the formation and storage of long-term memory in the hippocampus (De Oliveira 
Alvares et al., 2008; Campolongo et al., 2009), and plays a particular role in regulating emotional responses based on memory of fearful events (Ruehle et al., 2012).
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Boundary
The boundary serves two natural functions: it keeps the outside 
from being inside (i.e., establishes a physical line between self and 
non-self) and helps to defend what is held inside from threats 
originating in the environment (e.g., the role of cell membranes 
and multicellular skin). In the case of the human superorganism, 
the primary job is to keep unwanted people and hazardous 
substances out of the social “body.” The Border Patrol and 
Coast Guard services in the United States, for example, regulate 
immigration, exercise customs (i.e., prevent entry of illegal goods 
and hazardous materials), and control the spread of disease into 
the country with their quarantining authority. Sociopolitical 
TaBle 3 | Types of enforcement.
Type Who reason for punishment
Informal Everyone Non-performance of social role
Second-order Everyone Non-performance of informal enforcement role
Formal Police/judges “Criminal” enforcement (e.g., murder and assault)
TaBle 2 | The human superorganism as a living system.
subsystem Function examples
cell Organism human superorganism
systemic functions
Boundary Hold components together; regulate entry of elements 
from environment
Membrane Skin Army and border patrol
Enforcement Internal defense Lysosome Immune system Police
Structure Maintain proper (spatial) relationships among units Cytoskeleton (microfilaments/
tubules, vacuoles)
Skeleton Physical infrastructure (e.g., 
road systems, WWW)
Reproduction Create similar offspring Miosis Sexual reproduction Family-based reproduction
Control 
(decision-making)
Coordinate/regulate the system as a whole Chromosomes Brain Government bureaus
Material/energy functions
Production Transform materials or provide services for use within 
system
Ribosome and Golgi complex Digestive system Factory
Storage Retain material/energy within system for later use Mitochondria (energy) and 
endoplasmic reticulum 
(proteins)
Adipose tissue Warehouse
Distribution Transport material/energy between system components Cytoplasm Circulatory system Economy
Excretion Remove wastes from system Membrane vesicle Execratory system Sewer system
information functions
Perception 
(info-production)
Update information on external and internal conditions Chemical exchange Sensory organs Media organizations
Memory (info-storage) Retain information for later use Chemical states Endocannabinoid 
system
Archives
Communication 
(info-distribution)
Transmit information between internal components Chemical signaling (internal) Peripheral nervous 
system
Gossip networks
Signaling (info-excretion) Indicate state/express identity; send messages into 
external environment
Chemical signaling (external) Phenotypic markers 
and speech
Diplomatic corps and 
public relation organizations
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boundaries serve as markers of geographic territory, and as the 
site at which defensive agents can be deployed.
Boundaries can also move: human superorganisms can grow 
during their life spans, by increasing the number of families 
within it, either internally (through demographic “success”) or 
externally, by taking over members of other groups (e.g., through 
immigration). Growth can also be achieved by conquering entire 
groups (e.g., by invading a country with a military force) and 
thus incorporating surrounding territory, changing the location 
of boundaries.
Enforcement
Sometimes the boundary is ineffectual in protecting the group 
from hazards (e.g., at organism level, letting in pathogens, or at 
superorganism level, social parasites). This requires a second line 
of defense against threats that are (or have become) internal to 
the group. As stated above, this is the category of primary interest 
here because it includes moral action.
There are several kinds of threats in fact (Table 3). First, there 
can be problems with those who do not perform their social 
roles—social parasites, whether they are born into the group, or 
infiltrate it—who need punishing. Sometimes, even those who 
are “insiders” do not follow through on their responsibilities, or 
break the rules; these individuals need punishing. This is a job 
that, in the human superorganism, every citizen is informally 
expected to perform. Types of informal punishment are typically 
somewhat limited: shunning, verbal abuse, refusal to cooperate, 
or mild pain inducement.
Further, what can be called “second-order” enforcement, or 
the punishment of non-punishers, is directed at those who did 
not perform their function as informal punishers of primary 
offenses. Forcing non-enforcers to toe the line, or punishing 
those who engage in non-performance of the enforcement 
role, helps to produce group cohesion (Gintis, 2000; Hauert 
et al., 2007). However, perceived responsibility to perform this 
function can be dissipated by the presence of others in equal 
8Aunger HSoT of Morality
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org March 2017 | Volume 2 | Article 2
position to take on the task (the so-called “bystander effect”) 
(Darley and Latané, 1968).
Others (e.g., the police and legal system) are also weighed 
with the professional responsibility of punishing norm violators 
in the group. This formal enforcement is usually left to the police 
because enforcement in such cases is considered dangerous (e.g., 
targets violent offenders), is more serious (e.g., incarceration 
or major fines), or requires the authority of the state to “stick.” 
What gets punished in this case is often “criminal” malfeasance, 
which can include over-zealous punishment of within-group 
members without due cause (e.g., murder and assault). These 
acts of criminal enforcement are typically motivated by moral 
sentiments—that is, the individual who perpetrates the crime 
thinks they have a moral reason that justifies the act (e.g., she 
is my sexual partner and has violated our relationship; the “con-
demned” are members of an irreligious community), but the logic 
is not generally recognized in the cultural group. This includes 
the category of “crimes against the person” (in particular, their 
body—in the form of suicide, drug use, homicide, or assault and 
battery—or liberty, via slavery or abduction).
Note that, from a superorganism perspective, “unlawfully” 
eliminating a member of the group is also an offense against 
production (due to lost economic benefits) and reproduction 
(particularly to the family to whom the member belonged). These 
ramifications make unwarranted violence against insiders emo-
tionally reprehensible. Superorganism theory thus suggests that it 
is legitimate to injure or take the life of others if they are outsiders 
(especially in the context of inter-group conflict), and insiders 
too, if they are not being a “good citizen,” but that punishment of 
“good citizens” is itself punishable.
Structure
Structures like a vertebrate’s skeleton maintain spatial and 
functional relationships among an organism’s components. In a 
superorganism, structures include physical infrastructure such as 
city buildings, electricity, transportation, and other public service 
systems. (Note: structure is restricted to physical structures and 
processes; social processes are under the control function below.) 
Thus, hampering this function is associated with vandalism of 
public facilities (including religious buildings, cemeteries, monu-
ments, historic sites, and military installations), sabotage (major 
disruption to government functions, the use of public services, 
and potentially major economic loss), and mischief with respect to 
services (including transportation, water supply, postal services, 
and voting). These actions can destroy or damage public property, 
render it dangerous or inoperative, or obstruct its proper use or 
enjoyment. Such practices are often exhibited by juveniles, per-
haps because adolescence is a period during which individuals 
reflect on whether or not to follow social norms and conformist 
social roles (Waterman, 1985; Steinberg, 2007). Worker strikes 
can render well-functioning public services such as transport 
systems inoperative. Dependency on the infrastructures support-
ing the internet for many of the other superorganism functions 
is becoming significant. Hate crimes (e.g., ransacking a church 
or synagogue, abortion clinic or vivisectionist research lab) are a 
related phenomenon, which interferes with working relationships 
among subgroups of the superorganism (even graffiti is often 
sexist or racist or directed against religious groups). These kinds 
of offenses are often considered to be relatively minor but can 
involve substantial expense to the public purse, and be disruptive 
to (the quality of) public life. Vandalism can also risk public safety 
(e.g., by taking place in a context of rioting, where destruction of 
public property is used as a tactic of political protest).
Reproduction
Reproduction is the most crucial function for any living system, 
which must survive and duplicate itself (when it cannot persist 
indefinitely), or simply cease to exist. Insect superorganisms often 
reproduced by going through a “reproductive funnel” (all repro-
duction is handed over to a single individual, the hive queen), but 
in the human superorganism [as in mammalian societies generally 
(MacLean, 1990)], the unit of reproduction is the family, which 
produces copies of itself through a complex process of producing 
component parts—offspring—who then combine with members 
of other families to form new families. These cooperative breed-
ing units are necessary in humans because it is advantageous 
to recombine genetic adaptations. This requires sexual unions 
between unrelated individuals [so there is an optimal outbreed-
ing distance (Bateson, 1983)]. Because offspring are born highly 
immature and dependent, they also require investment from 
multiple individuals (ideally), so mothers pair-bond long-term 
with fathers to help provide that care and the necessary resources, 
both physical and cultural (since children have a lot to learn as 
well, being born altricial), for proper growth and development of 
the new member of society.
There are several ways for a family to fail to reproduce itself: 
poor choice of mate (e.g., same-sex coitus), or misallocation of 
reproductive effort (e.g., incest, as a failure of family members 
to mate outside the family, and thus reproduce the family unit). 
So in addition to the usual faults of stealing the reproductive 
resources of others (e.g., rape and child molestation), and inap-
propriate allocation of mating effort (e.g., bestiality), there is the 
potentially immoral action of not investing sufficiently in being 
a parent by failure to raise independent, prosocial offspring (e.g., 
neglect or abandonment of a child).
Control
Control, as conceived here, is essentially about subsystems that 
contribute to the guidance, coordination, and regulation of the 
internal system. Group-level control in a superorganism begins 
when some individuals restrict access of others to resources; 
this happens when social dominance or status conflicts arise. 
Alternatively, groups of low-status individuals can gain power 
by involving themselves in political coalitions (de Waal, 1982). 
Where boundary functions are directed toward outsiders, control 
functions are about regulation of internal processes, particularly 
social processes (unlike the structure function). These processes 
occur at several levels of organization. Human superorganisms 
contain organizations like government, businesses, religious 
groups, and fan clubs—one of the unique features associated 
with human ultrasociality. These organizations help to coordinate 
actions among the members that belong to them and to define 
relationships between those who belong to different organizations 
as well. In this way, they help give structure to social relationships. 
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Local institutions (both public and private) and national govern-
ments serve to regulate many of the other functions of those 
within their jurisdiction. These tend to be dominant forces in 
HSoTs in “making the rules” by which those in the group live.
Production
Production in the form of economic work is one of the primary 
requirements of any person living in a human superorganism. The 
individual’s obligation is therefore to find their most economi-
cally valuable role in their human superorganism, produce their 
output as efficiently as possible (i.e., to the best of their ability), 
and then make it available to the group as a whole. Failure to 
engage in any of these aspects of production should be culpa-
ble. Hence, engaging in subterfuge with respect to the rights of 
property, including intellectual property (so-called “white collar 
crime”), and thus gaining an unfair advantage in business, should 
be morally reprehensible.
Storage
As soon as people began to modify their environments in rela-
tively durable ways through their own labor, there was a need to 
defend these modifications from theft or appropriation. This 
includes shelters and tools, which had to be guarded by corporate 
groups (beginning with families). With the rise of agriculture, 
social systems began to accumulate surplus material resources, 
which required storage (e.g., seeds for subsequent planting). 
Safeguarding such stores became an important function for 
survival of the group. Destruction of these agricultural stores 
(e.g., destroying domesticated animals) should therefore be 
considered harmful. Failure to conserve resources (i.e., waste) or 
to set aside some portion of surpluses for a “rainy day” can also 
be seen as failures to optimally allocate resources over time, as 
well as reckless consumption or loss of resources (e.g., through 
gambling). Finally, there are criminal failures associated with 
“storing” people against their will—i.e., so-called “offenses against 
liberty” such as confinement, detention, and slavery—and not 
recognizing the value of “human capital,” or mistreating people 
as economic goods or chattel (e.g., slavery).
Distribution
Distribution is one of the primary needs once a social system 
involves a division of labor, as no one then produces all the means 
necessary to survive themselves and must acquire some of what 
they need from others in the group (Smith, 1904; Ridley, 2010). 
This is obviously the function of an economy (whether regulated 
or free market). Failures to abide by the rules of exchange (i.e., 
theft, breaches of contract obligations, and debasement of the 
means of exchange) should therefore be important targets of 
moral retribution.
Excretion
Animals of any kind should not surround themselves with their 
own wastes as this exposes group members to infection. Thus, 
there are always (implicit) rules in place about how to increase 
the distance between group members and their own waste 
(e.g., defecation grounds). This category has been extended in 
humans to include rules for controlling the social effects of any 
of an individual’s metabolic processes, such as eating, flatulence, 
or sneezing (i.e., manners). At the superorganism level, people 
should also be punished for not contributing to the production or 
maintenance of clean public spaces as well as sanitation systems 
such as sewers.
Perception
By perceiving its external and internal environment, an organism 
maintains and updates its awareness of current conditions. A vital 
task is to continually update information about any threats and 
opportunities arising, either from the external environment or 
from activities within the group itself. Scouting and reconnais-
sance efforts (e.g., spying) can uncover such information. Those 
who manage to gain access to such information have an obliga-
tion to share it with others in their human superorganism. Failure 
to do so, or to convey false information, can cause damage or 
result in lost opportunities, and hence represent moral failures 
by the responsible parties from the perspective of the human 
superorganism.
Memory
A living system learns through experience. If the information 
acquired in this way is not stored, it is lost. Whatever good 
information individuals have, and whatever useful learning 
that those in the group acquire through experience, should be 
stored for later use by themselves or others in the group should 
similar situations recur. Human groups depend significantly on 
information stored in linguistic form, which enables many new 
kinds of more specific information (e.g., social reputations) that 
can be distributed diffusely throughout the group (as in the 
nervous system of a multicellular organism). [Reputations begin 
even earlier than mammals; however, individual contributions to 
social production can be remembered and recalled even by fish 
(Alfieri and Dugatkin, 2009).] Groups often use older members of 
the group as stores of such information, as they are most likely to 
have had a wide range of experience, and to have survived those 
experiences. “Forgetfulness” should therefore be a “sin” (e.g., let-
ting old people die without “downloading” their wisdom). Group 
or cultural memory of the group’s history should also be seen as 
valuable as a means to preserve group identity.
Contemporary human groups also exhibit novel means of 
intergenerational information inheritance: cultural transmission 
(including, now, written and digital transmission) (Richerson 
et al., 2016) and significant niche construction (e.g., rebuilding 
the physical environment into forms such as cities) (Odling-Smee 
et al., 2003; Laland et al., 2015). These both lead to an increased 
ability to store information between generations through non-
genetic mechanisms.
Communication
Coordination of functions often requires that different subsystems 
get inputs about what is happening elsewhere in the system. This 
is the job of the informational equivalent of the circulation system 
that transfers material between components. In HSoT, this is 
accomplished at the interindividual level by linguistic exchanges 
(e.g., gossip about reputations). This function is facilitated by 
technological infrastructure such as the telecommunications 
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networks and world wide web, which allow communication 
between individuals who are not geographically proximate to 
one another. Misrepresentations of one’s own status or that of 
others in the social group (i.e., crimes related to reputation) are 
the primary cause of moral censure with respect to this function.
Signaling
Sometimes it is also necessary to exchange information with the 
outside environment, including interacting with other super-
organisms. Signaling typically concerns the (symbolic) power 
of the group as a whole (e.g., in inter-group conflicts), not the 
functioning of particular processes within the group (which 
affects control). Signaling can be cooperative or combative in 
intent, depending on the context and target. This “supersocial” 
communication between groups may involve translation from 
one language to another, or simple use of displays. For example, 
it is likely that the evolution of eusociality depended on a high 
level of group selection, which could have been associated with 
inter-group conflicts that began as territorial displays by large 
groups of soldiers (larger groups of soldiers indicate larger group 
size and hence greater colony strength) (Thorne et  al., 2003; 
Wilson and Hölldobler, 2005). The HSoT equivalent is obviously 
military parades and displays of weaponry, exemplified by the 
concept of mutually assured destruction—the display of weapons 
so powerful it is not necessary to actually use the weaponry in an 
attack. [Symbolic displays can also be important in the context 
of mating (e.g., leks and bowerbird nests) (Kirkpatrick and Ryan, 
1991); however, this context seems irrelevant to relations between 
superorganisms.] Defecting on participation in such aggressive 
displays could have been a significant cost to the group.
Signaling can also be important in cooperative situations, 
to indicate that a superorganism is a trustworthy partner for 
international trade or exchange, for example. Signals can also 
serve as markers of membership in cultural groups—e.g., political 
coalitions of superorganisms such as NATO or the Allied Powers 
in recent Western history. It is the job of diplomatic ministers to 
maintain good relations between governments, and public rela-
tions departments between organizations belonging to different 
superorganisms. The crime of treason or sedition (expression 
of sentiments in favor of or inciting insurrection against the 
established order) obviously undermines both cooperative and 
combative relations between human superorganisms by making 
the group look weak or uncoordinated.
The eVOlUTiOn OF MOraliTY in The 
hUMan lineage
We have already provided (in the introduction) an argument 
for how human society evolved into a (rough) superorganism; 
however, now that we have identified the particular functions 
required for superorganism status, we need to elaborate what 
developments in moral psychology accompanied this social 
innovation. As with any complex adaptation, it is likely that moral 
capacities emerged gradually, through a number of evolutionary 
innovations, so not all of these functions are crucial to the evolu-
tion of ultrasociality and hence human morality, as they were 
present prior to the arrival of large-scale human groups. Here, 
we are interested in identifying which aspects of superorganism 
function were crucial to making this major transition, and which 
therefore constitute the essential elements of human morality.
Comparative biology can provide clues as to which of the 
functions appeared in the human lineage prior to ultrasocial liv-
ing. For example, reproduction through families is characteristic 
of many mammals, so reproduction could not have been crucial. 
Similarly, xenophobia and preference for insiders (the psychologi-
cal underpinnings of boundary) are evident in many mammalian 
species (Hammond and Axelrod, 2006; Efferson et al., 2008; Fu 
et al., 2012) so boundary is not key either.
Basic storage, in the form of housing, is present even in insects, 
but also in reptiles and mammals. Humans expanded the types of 
structures and devised new means of construction to allow larger 
structures (e.g., weight-bearing arches) (Aunger, 2010) but largely 
after the transition to large social groups, so this function does 
not appear crucial either.
Excretion was largely a personal, private matter until the evo-
lution of cities, which required novel innovations for dealing with 
human waste (e.g., sewerage systems); these are of very recent 
origin (i.e., the last thousand years), so this function could not 
have held up the transition to ultrasociality.
The basic function of memory (long-term memory/recall in 
brains) is evolutionarily old and may have sufficed to coordinate 
ultrasocial life (e.g., memory among elders of earlier experi-
ences), but ultrasociality may also have required more reliable 
intergenerational recall of important information—which was 
made possible first through writing, possibly about 5,000 years 
ago [although the first markings on bone date to 30,000 years ago 
(Davis, 1974)]. The earliest writings tend to document economic 
exchanges, suggesting a link with markets, and hence large-scale 
societies. The contemporaneity of writing and large-scale social 
organization suggests that this “augmented” memory may have 
been important in helping superorganisms to cohere. Memory 
continues to evolve new modalities today, as significantly new 
forms of non-genetic intergenerational inheritance evolved after 
the transition to ultrasociality (e.g., digital communications).
Perception is about monitoring external threats and opportu-
nities—that is, keeping an accurate, up-to-date account of what 
is going on in the external environment. For example, chimps 
have been known to patrol their territorial limits as groups to 
investigate what is going on in other groups (Williams et al., 2004) 
and to identify ripe fruit sources (Janmaat et al., 2013). Human 
hunter-gatherers do the same (Cashdan, 1983). Specialists at 
performing this function are media organizations that keep the 
population up with any relevant news, but these obviously arose 
late in history, suggesting that innovations in perception did not 
constrain ultrasociality.
While signaling outsiders can be done with simple iconic 
messages (e.g., threats of aggressive intent), Communication 
within large unrelated groups likely required syntactic language 
to maintain personal reputations, and thus avoid punishment 
for being antisocial. Maintaining reputations in large groups 
requires complex language abilities—the ability to gossip about 
others (Dunbar, 1998). In particular, recent modeling efforts 
suggest that the ability to maintain reputations (and thus avoid 
11
Aunger HSoT of Morality
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org March 2017 | Volume 2 | Article 2
punishment) is crucial to the formation of large unrelated groups, 
as indirect fitness benefits, relatedness, and memory for past 
dyadic interactions quickly diminish in larger groups (Powers 
and Lehmann, 2016). When this innovation in communication 
occurred remains highly contentious, however, although most 
would argue it happened sometime during hominid or hominoid 
evolution (Hauser et  al., 2002; Corballis, 2012; Morgan et  al., 
2015). Communication is thus probably uniquely human and 
may have been required to coordinate ultrasocial cooperation.
Enforcement, in a superorganism context, requires third-party 
punishment, or the willingness and ability to punish others in the 
group for antisocial activity, even when the individual themselves 
has not been involved or injured (Gintis et al., 2008). Further, in 
major transition theory, it is the enforcement function, which is 
always crucial to the achievement of higher levels of organization 
(Corning and Szathmáry, 2015; Szathmáry, 2015; West et  al., 
2015). The evolution of social complexity thus depends strongly 
on the existence of effective within-group suppression mecha-
nisms—that is, enforcement that minimizes antisocial activity 
among group members (Frank, 1995; Bowles et al., 2003; Joyce, 
2007). In particular, sanctioning institutions fare better than non-
sanctioning ones (Gürerk et al., 2006), and fair institutions (i.e., 
which reduce free riding) are also more likely to evolve (Kosfeld 
et  al., 2009; Kube et  al., 2015) probably because they suppress 
within-group variability in selective outcomes. It is evident that 
individuals will actually perform third-party norm enforcement 
occurs in real-world situations in a variety of contexts (e.g., 
Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012; Yoeli et al., 2013; Tsusaka et al., 
2015; Przepiorka and Berger, 2016).
However, this important mechanism, needed to drive coop-
eration in large-scale groups, appears lacking in non-human 
primates. Although they do reject lower-valued rewards than 
fellow experimental subject animals (Brosnan and de Waal, 2014) 
and thus care about relative outcomes, apes have thus far not been 
demonstrated to reject unfair offers in ultimatum games (Proctor 
et al., 2013), suggesting that they do not have a general principle 
of fairness. Third-party punishment in non-human primates 
has thus yet to be conclusively demonstrated (Hall and Brosnan, 
2016; Talbot et al., 2016; Schmidt and Rakoczy, in press), making 
enforcement a candidate for the crucial advance. A recent review 
of experimental studies on responses to unequal rewards in 
primates suggests that the factor which best correlates (across 10 
species) with aggressive responses to unfair offers is the frequency 
with which members of that species cooperate with non-kin; that 
is, species which routinely engage in cooperative hunting, coali-
tions, alliances, and/or food sharing (Hall and Brosnan, 2016). Of 
course, the primary constraint on the evolution of ultrasociality 
is cooperation with non-kin, so this correlation is an important 
confirmation of the centrality of this aspect of moral functionality.
The date at which this innovation occurred is difficult to pin-
point, but it must have been in the last six million years, since that 
is when our most recent common ancestor diverged from other 
primates. Presumably, large-scale social groups simply would not 
form and function without an enforcement mechanism being in 
place, so we can look to the archeological record for evidence of 
such groups. (Any sufficiently large human group will have low 
average relatedness, and hence require third-party enforcement.) 
Such groups appear to have been a fairly recent innovation, as the 
earliest appeared no more than about 10,000 years ago (Bellwood, 
2004).
Pool punishment (the game theoretic equivalent of paying a 
tax toward a police force) can emerge in situations where second-
order free riders are punished—that is, where those who fail to 
punish are themselves punished (Zhang et al., 2014). People prefer 
to use policing to maintain common-pool resources (Andreoni 
and Gee, 2012; Traulsen et al., 2012). The evolution of specialized 
social institutions for internal sanctioning and punishment came 
surprisingly late. The ancient world (China, Rome, and Greece) 
did not have specialized domestic police forces, but rather 
used slaves, local magistrates, or government administrators to 
enforce laws and regulations, but were notoriously lax in doing 
so (Hunter, 1994; Jones, 2014). Modern policing began only in 
the 1600s (Critchley, 1978).
Control of large social groups probably first took place 
through implicit rule making and reference to social norms. 
Examples include rules of food sharing in hunter-gatherers, 
rules for the using irrigation systems in agriculturalists, informal 
property rights, and systems for sharing reputation between trad-
ers (Johnson and Earle, 2000). Use of norms was probably made 
stronger through sacralization—investing normative options 
with extra meaning and social force through reference to absolute 
values—to help ensure prosocial behavior when individual- and 
group-level incentives conflict (Marshall, 2010).
Later, control became a specialized activity, eventually mani-
festing itself in the development of a professional class, bureaucrats 
and/or priests, and new forms of organization such as corporations 
(Wirth, 1938). A crucial innovation was therefore institutions, or 
self-created rules of social organization where cooperation can 
be individually advantageous even in large groups of unrelated 
individuals. Forming institutions requires shared intentionality, 
language, and other cognitive abilities largely absent in other pri-
mates (Powers et al., 2016). So organizations are quintessentially 
human, and coevolved with superorganism status.
In their ultrasocial form, all the economic functions—pro-
duction, distribution, and structures—are related to a division 
of labor. However, they appear to be consequences, rather than 
instigators, of ultrasociality—that is, they are only necessary once 
ultrasociality has arisen. In particular, per capita production 
increased significantly in human society as social roles differenti-
ated with economic specialization, but this only occurred once 
cities had developed.
Distribution is not necessary until there are significant social 
inter-dependencies, due to economic specialization, a recent 
feature of human society. Distribution can occur “naturally” 
through the unsupervised diffusion of goods and services via 
multifarious interactions. However, some distributions could 
lead to conflict over ownership or payment, and therefore require 
enforcement functions. Distribution is therefore likely to be 
associated with a concern with fairness, which only arises after 
cooperative ventures, or when exchanges take place, but again 
probably only post-facto, not as an initiator, of enforcement. 
Superorganismal distribution essentially takes advantage of an 
adaptation that had already arisen for other reasons. In this case, 
an elaboration of fairness took place: chimps sometimes engage 
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in group hunting and exhibit a concern for fair allocation or shar-
ing (Boesch, 2002). However, in humans, fairness was extended 
to cover concern for fair exchange of goods produced by separate, 
non-collaborative activities, once human societies had developed 
economic specialization.3
Similarly, structures such as road and electricity systems are 
of very recent origin on an evolutionary timescale, and related to 
city life, but again are derivative of the essential transition point, 
and probably without needing specific psychological innovations 
for their construction.
The late development of these “economic” functions suggests 
that the major transition to superorganism status constitutes what 
is called a “fraternal” transition (Queller, 2000). In fraternal tran-
sitions, similar units join together, reaping the benefits first from 
new economies of scale, and then evolving a division of labor 
through differentiation (similar to the development of complex 
multicellular organisms with multiple organ systems from simple 
multicellular organisms without internal differentiation). On the 
other hand, in “egalitarian” transitions, dissimilar units come 
together, so that their functions are complemented through the 
formation of a higher-level unit—e.g., the eukaryotic cell, which 
combines elements from multiple, more primitive cell types. 
Obviously, in fraternal transitions, the differentiation takes place 
as the final step of the transition and can continue to increase 
once the transition has successfully established a higher-order 
unit (Szathmáry, 2015).
The crucial innovations required to support the transition to 
ultrasocial living therefore seem to be associated with control, 
enforcement, and communication—essentially, social institu-
tions, exchange-based punishment, and syntactic language. These 
developments are in fact interrelated, in that social reputations 
are maintained by language (gossip) (Joyce, 2007; Tse, 2008), and 
stories about miscreant activity can lead to third-party punish-
ment. Further, punishment has been institutionalized into police 
forces in modern societies.
The account produced via this logic is similar in many 
respects to that devised by Krebs (2008) from a somewhat 
different evolutionary foundation. He suggested that the first 
development in human morality was social life, which intro-
duced differences of rank (requiring new social emotions such 
as deference and awe), as well as conflicts of interest. This in turn 
required the evolution of resolution mechanisms such as social 
sanctions, followed by the internalization of moral norms via 
fear of punishment, and anticipated regret and remorse, all of 
which were facilitated in turn by the ability (through so-called 
“theory of mind”) to adopt the perspective of others. Such 
internalized motivations for moral action have lower biological 
and social costs, as actual conflict can often be avoided when 
individuals prejudge the consequences of their actions and curb 
their antisocial proclivities. A fourth development was then 
the development of language and symbolic thinking, which 
facilitated the formation of moral judgments (the foundation 
of a sense of fairness). These judgments were finally themselves 
3 There is one specialized form of exchange in non-human primates, of food for 
sex (de Waal, 1996), but this reflects a sexual division of labor that exists in many 
sexual species.
internalized into moral intuitions (i.e., subconscious predilec-
tions to find particular acts immoral or wrong). Such a sequence 
is consistent with the overall picture painted above, identifying 
several of the same mechanisms (e.g., complex language and 
third-party sanctioning) while making some nice theoretical 
additions in terms of explaining the origin of particular psy-
chological adaptations such as moral intuitions.
Another prominent theorist of the evolution of morality, 
Franz De Waal, also admits that “objectified” concern for fairness, 
expressed positively as a generalized empathy, and facilitated 
by language, is a uniquely human aspect of morality (de Waal, 
2009). He says, “We have no evidence that other animals judge the 
appropriateness of actions that do not affect themselves. The great 
pioneer of morality research, the Finn Edward Westermarck, 
explained what makes the moral emotions special: “Moral emo-
tions are disconnected from one’s immediate situation: they deal 
with good and bad at a more abstract, disinterested level.” This 
is what sets human morality apart: a move toward universal 
standards combined with an elaborate system of justification, 
monitoring and punishment.” (De Waal, 2010)
So punishment of antisocial behavior by anyone, facilitated by 
the development of instinctive moral tendencies, the maintenance 
of reputations through language, and the eventual institutionali-
zation of punishment and norms in military and police were the 
human elaborations of morality that were central to the transition 
of human society to a superorganism.
cOMParisOn TO OTher aPPrOaches
Having laid out the basic claims of HSoT, and provided an evo-
lutionary story for its development, we can now compare it to 
alternative explanations of the moral domain.
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT)
Perhaps the most advanced and widely accepted contemporary 
approach to understanding the moral universe is MFT (Haidt 
and Joseph, 2007). This theory is based on an insight from cross-
cultural work that moral considerations exist beyond the typical 
Western concerns of harm and fairness (which are both associated 
with individual rights). 4 MFT asserts that there are also moral 
concerns about spiritual purity and degradation, about fulfilling 
roles in a social hierarchy, and about expectations of loyalty to 
the local or national group. It is based in earlier work on three 
“ethics” or “moral codes” (autonomy, community, and divin-
ity), identified by Richard Shweder during cross-cultural work 
(Shweder et al., 1997; Rozin et al., 1999). To this base, authority 
[from relational models theory (Fiske, 1991)] and harm/care 
[from attachment theory (Bowlby, 1979)] were added, based on 
a cross-cultural review of research on virtues (Haidt and Joseph, 
4 MFT and HSoT share some intellectual foundations, as Haidt (2012) has argued 
that major transitions in human evolution led to superorganisms, and that morality 
is an evolved solution to the free rider problem. Nevertheless, I argue that the 
current paper makes a number of advances over MFT: it provides a derivation of 
the functions’ characteristic of human superorganisms, then links those functions 
to categories of moral concern, and also demonstrates a strong association between 
categories of moral concern and types of offense in a consensual criminal code.
TaBle 4 | Domains of human superorganism Theory (hsoT) versus 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT).
MFT hsoT concern
Purity/sanctity Excretion Disease avoidance (disgust)
Harm/care Reproduction Violence to self/kin
Loyalty/betrayal Boundary Insiders versus outsiders
Fairness/
cheating
Distribution Resource allocation issues arising 
from the division of labor
Authority/
subversion
Structure Status differentials (MFT); general 
organizational issues (HSoT)
Liberty/
oppression
Control Maintenance of group cohesion and 
coordination of within-group functions
– Perception, memory, 
and communication
Information processing functions
– Production and 
storage
Fulfilment of social roles
– Enforcement Internal defense
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2004). In its most recent formulation (Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 
2013; Koleva et al., in press), MFT suggests that morality has six 
dimensions (what I will call the “Six Dimension Hypothesis”)5:
• Harm/care (attachment, empathy, and nurture)
• Fairness/cheating (based on reciprocal altruism, with idea of 
justice, property rights and autonomy)
• Loyalty/betrayal (coalition formation and self-sacrifice for 
group)
• Authority/subversion (recognition of status differentials; 
respect for tradition)
• Sanctity/desecration (based in the sense of disgust and 
contamination, body as a temple, underlies attempts to live 
elevated, and less carnal life)
• Liberty/oppression (reactance/resentment at dominance; 
often in tension with authority dimension)
Comparing the domain of moral concern defined by HSoT to 
that resulting from MFT is quite difficult to do, given that the two 
theories have somewhat different ambitions: MFT looks at the 
psychological foundations or dimensions of support for moral-
ity, while HSoT identifies kinds of cheating that affect functional 
problems for social groups. Nevertheless, we can attempt to draw 
rough parallels between their categories (Table 4).6
As there is nothing in MFT to which HSoT does not have an 
equivalent, this comparison suggests that HSoT covers the entire 
range of MFT, plus some additional territory. This indicates that, 
although MFT has considerably broadened the notion of morality 
beyond individual rights and obligations (i.e., harm and fairness 
concerns), it still has not identified all the ways in which people 
can “fail their group” and hence be morally punished.
In particular, HSoT identifies several entirely new categories 
of moral concern. The first is associated with group-level infor-
mation processing.7 According to HSoT, one has obligations to 
correctly transmit information about others through the social 
group (the communication function), not to violate group 
memory about its own past and to ensure that others perceive the 
group correctly. If we make the assumption that legal sanctions 
reflect a community’s moral concern with various types of action, 
then the fact that there are “information-based” crimes would 
support HSoT. In fact, failures to deal with social information 
truthfully are legalized in many criminal codes (as crimes of 
slander, perjury, and treason, for example).
5 The sixth dimension, liberty/oppression, was added in 2011, and several others 
(including honesty, ownership, and self-control) are currently being investigated 
as well (Haidt, 2012).
6 Kesebir (2012) argues that each of the foundations of MFT has a specific role 
in the human superorganism (working from the earlier version with five dimen-
sions). She suggests that purity/sanctity is about preservation of the “natural order” 
and of the “meaning system,” thus distinguishing moral acts from the mundane. 
The harm/care foundation derives from the mammalian system of attachment 
(between mother and offspring). It underlines the basic moral capacity to dislike 
the pain of others. The in-group loyalty foundation involves hostility toward 
free riders and traitors and is concerned with “sharpening group boundaries,” 
while fairness/reciprocity underlies the human concern with egalitarianism (i.e., 
economic exchanges). Hierarchy/duty calls for respectful submission to legitimate 
authorities, institutions, and cultural traditions.
7 The MFT questionnaire includes items on cultural history or tradition related to 
memory but categorizes them differently.
The second novel area concerns the fulfillment of social 
roles (i.e., the production and storage of material produced). 
An important aspect of modern human groups is the existence 
of organizations like businesses, governmental bureaucracies, 
and local clubs. MFT has little concern for social role fulfill-
ment except for recognizing the authority of others (i.e., being 
subservient in social relations). HSoT suggests one has an 
obligation to the group to fulfill one’s potential in one or more 
socially productive roles (contrary to the notion that one is free 
to express oneself and choose how to spend one’s life without 
concern for others). Again, if failure to fulfill the missions of 
the various organizations to which one belongs is moralized, 
that would support HSoT. In fact, various kinds of failures to 
perform official or private duties are criminalized in many 
societies.8
Further, there is nothing in MFT about a third issue: the 
moralization of failures to punish or contribute to social welfare, 
or “second-order morality,” associated with the enforcement 
domain. Again, criminal codes suggest that these areas are in fact 
moralized: people in some countries can be fined or imprisoned 
for not helping during emergencies or for taking their punish-
ments of others to an extreme, as in injuring or killing innocent 
others.
8 However, one of the dimensions “currently under investigation” by those 
associated with MFT (Haidt, 2012) is “ownership,” which arguably is a psycho-
logical motivation underlying production and storage of goods and services, 
while another, “honesty,” could be said to be associated with moral performance 
of the information functions of perception, memory, and communication (e.g., 
reputation management). In this way, several of the “holes” in the comparison in 
Table 8 could be filled, making MFT more similar in range to HSoT, although 
still without the simple theoretical definition of the moral domain as cheater 
suppression mechanisms in human superorganisms. Haidt’s definition (Haidt, 
2012), by contrast, is this: “moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, 
norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological 
mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make 
cooperative societies possible.” This definition does not limit morality to humans, 
as many species have evolved psychological mechanisms to support cooperation, 
or if restricted to humans by the focus on institutions and technologies, does not 
describe why we need these extra mechanisms in order to cooperate effectively.
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Finally, MFT has difficulty explaining “victimless crimes” 
(http://faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/Current_Research.html). 
Why do many people moralize issues related to intake of food, 
“deviant” sex, and self-abuse? MFT suggests these moral intui-
tions are related to ideas of purity or sacredness (e.g., suicide is 
bad because we have a soul; bestiality because it is “unnatural”). 
On the other hand, HSoT suggests that these so-called “vices” 
are not moral add-ons, or difficult to explain, but are also fun-
damentally antisocial in the sense of subverting important func-
tions of the superorganism. These actions are not in fact without 
harm, but rather cause harm to the “body politic”: they involve 
failures to perform the literally vital functions of reproducing the 
superorganism, either because individuals are withholding their 
own productivity as components of the superorganism, or fail to 
reproduce themselves effectively, thereby not helping to create 
the next generation of superorganism components (i.e., families). 
Thus, there are many kinds of actions which MFT does not (cur-
rently) cover but which HSoT suggests should be moralized.
Model of Moral Motives (MMM) approach
Recently, Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) presented a novel 
approach to describing the moral domain, represented by a dia-
gram with two dimensions: one dimension distinguishes between 
prescriptive and proscriptive regulation (“shoulds” and “should 
nots”) while the second identifies the target of the regulation: self, 
other, or group (Janoff-Bulman and Carnes, 2013). These two 
dimensions create a matrix of six cells covering different kinds 
of infringements and virtues. They call this the MMM approach. 
So both inhibiting and activating actions can be directed either 
at the self (to explain “victimless” transgressions), at others (the 
domain of standard harm/fairness concerns) or at the group, 
through rules such as minimizing social inequality and protect-
ing in-group members from external threats.
As the authors of this approach note, MFT covers only three 
of the six cells in their matrix: ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, 
and purity/sanctity are group-oriented proscriptive while harm/
care and fairness/reciprocity cover the other-regarding moral 
rules, with fairness being considered a kind of positive action. This 
leaves off the self-focused codes and prescriptive group-oriented 
ones out of the mix. So MMM covers more ground than MFT.
Dyadic Morality approach
A third approach, called Dyadic Morality, is grounded in the 
cognitive psychology of concepts, and suggests that morality is 
understood through the template of a dyad—an intentional moral 
agent and victim—linked by the causal action taken by the agent 
on the victim (e.g., physical abuse and cheating) (Gray et al., 2012, 
2014). Where each of these components is not explicit, there is 
a mental operation that completes the dyadic relationship. For 
example, even “victimless” moral injunctions (e.g., against mas-
turbation) should be considered to have the self as a victim, while 
flag burning should be considered to victimize the group the flag 
represents. This victim—whether a person, God, social institu-
tion, or future generations—may suffer physically, emotionally, 
or spiritually. Moral judgment is always about the perception of 
intended harm, which is the single “currency” of moral calculus. 
Essentially, the approach equates wrongness with harm.
In general, then, HSoT is inconsistent with Dyadic Morality 
theory (but not MFT) in arguing that morality has a number of 
foundations or functions (each with a somewhat different psy-
chology), but consistent with Dyadic Morality theory’s emphasis 
on harm as the central principle underlying moral judgments 
(Gray et al., 2012). HSoT is also technically consistent with the 
orientation of MMM (Janoff-Bulman and Carnes, 2013), with its 
emphasis on a wide range of moral infringements, but not with its 
theoretical argument nor with the content of the moral domain.
Overall comparison
I argue that HSoT has a number of theoretical advantages over 
these alternatives. The first is parsimony: all of the claims from 
HSoT derive from a single proposition: that morality evolved as 
a system of social obligations designed to “solve” cooperation 
problems in large groups of unrelated individuals. This is more 
parsimonious than MFT, which amalgamates six foundations 
from various sources to explain the domain of moral concerns. 
Indeed, it is difficult to know where MFT should stop in terms 
of its identification of foundations, as it has already expanded 
from three to six dimensions and there are grounds to believe 
that other foundations remain to be identified (Haidt, 2012). 
In contrast, the number of domains or foundations for HSoT is 
fixed. MMM and Dyadic Morality theory can also be said to be 
founded on single principles (approach/avoidance and the dyad 
concept, respectively), so they also seem to have an advantage 
over MFT.
Second is the issue of theoretical foundations. HSoT has its 
foundation in evolutionary biology (specifically multilevel selec-
tion theoretical explanations of major transitions), rather than 
in the psychology of motivation and self-regulation [for MMM 
(Janoff-Bulman and Carnes, 2013)] or the cognitive psychology 
of concepts [for Dyadic Morality (Gray et al., 2012)]. Evolutionary 
biology is generally thought to be a stronger scientific foundation 
than specific principles in psychology.
Third is the issue of the extent of the moral domain. Like the 
alternatives, HSoT includes moral infringements against the self 
(e.g., suicide, drug abuse, and bestiality), against others (e.g., 
burglary and murder) and against the group (e.g., destruction of 
public property and treason). But MMM also includes the pos-
sibility of “positive” morality. Although not emphasized here, it is 
possible that prosocial acts, and rewards for performing the same 
(e.g., commendations andreputational enhancement), could sup-
port superorganismal functionality, and so have been selected for 
over time, such that psychological predilections for performing 
such behaviors would be part of moral judgment. This would 
mean that HSoT covers all the same ground as MMM, but also 
the purely information-based superorganism functions (percep-
tion, memory, communication, and signaling)—a larger overall 
territory. On the other hand, Dyadic Morality does not provide 
clear indications as to what the limits of the moral domain might 
be (i.e., if anything can be a harm of some sort to some sort of 
victim, what sorts of relations are excluded?). So it is difficult to 
say that Dyadic Morality theory makes a clear empirical predic-
tion about what can be moral and what non-moral. Further, none 
of the alternative approaches includes “second-order morality” or 
punishability of a failure to punish first-order miscreants. HSoT 
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thus (at least potentially) explains the largest domain among 
these alternatives. Evidence from criminal law thus suggests 
social groups do find a very broad range of actions morally objec-
tionable and worthy of punishment, including treason, homicide, 
theft, adultery, arson, corruption, kidnapping, forgery, slander, 
fraud, public drunkenness, denigration of a corpse, divulging of 
secrets, trespass, and failure to disclose knowledge of conspiracy. 
It therefore seems that all of the things considered by HSoT are 
what is actually moralized in practice by people. Hence, bring-
ing the domain that can be explained theoretically into closer 
conformity with practice would seem advantageous. For these 
reasons, HSoT has the best suite of features and therefore should 
be preferred.
DiscUssiOn
Human Superorganism Theory suggests that a group’s morality 
reflects how that society is organized. Morality is designed to pro-
duce “good” behavior, but what is “good” is a function of the ways 
in which a given superorganism has been organized (including 
via cultural rules). “Good” people are therefore those who fulfill 
their roles in their superorganism; those who do not are “bad.” In 
this way, specific actions may be required by one superorganism, 
but not another.
Moral action feeds off failed demonstrations of particular 
practices, and the sanctioning thereof. It achieves this by moraliz-
ing specific cultural practices, to which individuals must conform 
or risk punishment from their fellows. How these behaviors are 
selected for moralization is an interesting question. HSoT sug-
gests this process is related to the action’s ability to demonstrate 
prosocial tendencies, or to the action’s relationship to some 
superorganism function. While there may be some arbitrariness 
in the initial choice of practices used to demonstrate prosocial 
intentions and trustworthiness, there is likely to be some selection 
of those which serve a social function. This is certainly the case for 
manners, for example, where European rules of etiquette that had 
hygienic functions (e.g., urinating in private) were more likely 
to persist over several centuries than those which were simply 
local conventions (such as where to place one’s hands during a 
meal) (Nichols, 2002). Inter-group variation in moral codes can 
thus be arbitrary and non-functional in their origin, but prob-
ably become functional once they become sanctionable moral 
practices, as they reinforce social cohesion and limit cheating.
Similarly, there can be justifiable variation in moral codes 
within societies. This is seen quite effectively in the degree of con-
cern about the rule of primogeniture—the need for a male heir to 
continue the family’s ability to hold onto wealth. The strength of 
this need differs between heads of state, and poor people. In the 
line of English kings, not only wealth but also continued political 
power depends on a male offspring. The consequences are that 
any woman who marries into such a family must bear a son, and 
therefore is treated largely as chattel. She can be beaten, raped, 
and humiliated by her husband without compunction, and must 
not have any lovers (because then the fruit of her womb becomes 
suspect), while the husband can philander to his heart’s content—
all while entirely different morals hold in lower classes of the same 
society around the institution of marriage (e.g., men cannot rape 
wives without compunction). Only a theory that allows morality 
to be a function of social organization can explain such variation 
in what is considered to be “right” behavior within societies.
Further, HSoT suggests that changes in moral rules over 
time should be associated with changes in the ways societies are 
organized. Thus, particular actions can be held to be “right” in a 
given situation at a given time in a particular superorganism, but 
not in another because some aspect of social organization has 
changed. For example, women can only be treated as chattel when 
they are economically irrelevant. This can be seen in societies 
that adopted agriculture, where women no longer brought in sig-
nificant calories (they had been primary provisioners in forager 
societies). Instead, men were needed to manage beasts of burden 
to plow the fields, and still did the hunting, so women no longer 
contributed to primary economic production, allowing them 
to become just another kind of male property (Sanday, 1973). 
Thus, HSoT suggests diversity in social rules—whether between 
societies, within a society, or in the same society over time—can 
be explained using a single function that is implemented using 
a universal psychological mechanism. It is simply that substan-
tively variable rules for organizing social life apply in different 
cultural groups.
All of this depends on the legitimacy of the suggestion that 
human societies can profitably be considered (crude) superor-
ganisms. As indicated earlier, the truth of this assertion depends 
on human society having undergone a major transition toward 
strong group-level regulation of social life. An example of regula-
tion at the social level can be seen in eusocial insect colonies, 
where the lifespan, growth rate, and rate of reproduction of these 
colonies are nearly indistinguishable from those of individual 
organisms (scaled to their difference in sizes), suggesting that 
superorganisms obey the same kinds of metabolic rules as units 
at the lower level of organization (Gillooly et al., 2010). Similarly, 
human social networks regulate metabolic features of the indi-
viduals within them. In particular, a person is 10% more likely to 
be obese if the friends of their friends’ friends are obese, even if 
they do not know those people directly (Christakis and Fowler, 
2009). People are not aware of the structure of their own networks 
and do not control them. Yet how people are connected deter-
mines what kinds of functions the network can perform, as well as 
its qualities (e.g., people tend to be happier in denser networks). 
Human social networks thus have emergent properties—the 
primary quality of a complex adaptive system. For these reasons, 
the collective of all social networks in a population can be called 
a “human superorganism” (Christakis and Fowler, 2009).9
9 Although I have focused here exclusively on individuals, I note that superorgan-
isms are complex superstructures. Just as the human body is not composed simply 
of cells (but also liquids, minerals, and numerous commensal species), superorgan-
isms are not composed simply of people (Epstein, 2015). Supporting ecological 
structures help superorganisms to function. Cities, for example, contain human-
built structures and systems (e.g., roads, buildings, and electricity grids). So a 
proper social ontology must also contain physical structures and think of social 
phenomena as being instantiated via practices taking place in particular spaces 
and times (Schatzki, 2003). Indeed, one can think of the human superorganism as 
an architecture of instantiated social practices that function together like a living 
thing (Kemmis et al., 2012).
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Of course, the mechanisms through which social control 
occurs remain important. Human superorganisms differ from 
eusocial insect colonies in not being able to depend on the genes 
in such groups sharing a common fate—genetic diversity is much 
higher in human societies than among haplodiploid social insects. 
Nor do individuals acquire all their goods directly from those 
who produce them. Hence, kin selection and reciprocal altruism 
cannot explain the level of cooperation observed in modern 
human societies. Here, we have argued that the function of moral 
concerns is to induce behaviors that help such ultrasocial groups 
cohere, both through fear of punishment for antisocial behavior 
and the promise of rewards for prosocial behavior (Janoff-Bulman 
and Carnes, 2013). This need for regulation arose because of the 
incredible degree of interdependence between people living in 
societies characterized by a sophisticated division of labor. We 
have also sought to delineate the dimensions of the moral domain 
by outlining the kinds of obligations individuals can owe to a 
human superorganism.
A major advantage of this approach is that it brings a soci-
ety’s legal systems much closer to its moral systems—they can 
be shown to overlap in content to a much greater degree than 
when moral justification is based on traditional approaches 
limited to fairness and harm. In particular, the categories of 
moral concern identified in this way also map closely onto the 
types of offenses in a consensus-based criminal code derived 
from legal codes from around the world, suggesting that HSoT 
is consistent with the kinds of problems that social groups 
actually need to solve through sanctioning systems. HSoT can 
thus provide a parsimonious yet powerful way of delineating 
the domain of real-world moral concerns. This could present 
a significant boon to legal scholars and others seeking to 
legitimate the criminalization of particular kinds of antisocial 
behavior.
cOnclUsiOn
Hume (1998) thought that the need for justice is a function of a 
society’s size: in small societies, members can rely on kinship to 
align interests and thus minimize conflict; he thought that only 
when society extends beyond the narrow circle of kin does the 
need arise for rules to regulate human affairs (Hume, 1998). This 
is essentially equivalent to the claim (without an evolutionary 
context) of HSoT that morality is necessary when human socie-
ties become composed of large groups of unrelated individuals. 
HSoT claims that moral concerns arose from the need to police 
social actions in human “superorganisms” (i.e., large groups 
without shared kinship). It is grounded in major transitions 
theory (Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 1995), which explains 
how human groups organized into crude “superorganisms.” 
HSoT identifies a broader range of moral concerns than compet-
ing approaches such as MFT (Haidt, 2007), the MMM approach 
(Janoff-Bulman and Carnes, 2013), or Dyadic Morality theory 
(Gray et al., 2012, 2014). It also allows one to develop a sophisti-
cated story about how human morality differentiated itself from 
simpler forms in our primate relatives. For these reasons, HSoT 
appears to be an advance in understanding the nature of human 
morality.
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